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Abstract
It is well known that, despite being mathematically sound, control laws that display high temporal
variability are undesirable from an engineering perspective. The effects of volatility in the control input
manifest in myriad ways depending on the application and are invariably deleterious to the controlled
system. In this article we are concerned with the temporal volatility of the regulator’s control process in
discrete time Linear Quadratic Regulators (LQRs). Our investigation in this paper unearths a surprising
and very fundamental connection between the cost functional which the LQR is tasked with minimizing
and the temporal variations of its control laws.
We first show that optimally controlling the system always implies high levels of control volatility,
i.e., it is impossible to reduce volatility in the optimal control process without sacrificing cost. We also
show that, akin to communication systems, every LQR has a Capacity Region associated with it, that
dictates and quantifies how much cost is achievable at a given level of control volatility. This additionally
establishes the fact that no admissible control policy can simultaneously achieve low volatility and low
cost.
We then employ this analysis to explain an important phenomenon observed in deregulated electricity
markets. Spot prices in such markets in the United States and Europe have historically displayed high
volatility, leading to loss of revenue in high electricity costs, weakening economic growth and lost busi-
ness from long blackouts. With rapidly increasing supply of intermittent solar and wind-based power,
conditions in the foreseeable future are only expected to deteriorate. Geographic price variations, while
capable of being quite dramatic themselves, are a natural outcome of Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP)
that takes finite transmission capacity and congestion into consideration, to produce localized electricity
prices. Temporal price volatility (considerable fluctuation over periods as short as an hour in particular),
however, is harder to explain.
In an effort to unearth the cause of these price fluctuations, we model the electricity market as a
discrete time controlled stochastic process. Using our analysis of control volatility in LQRs we show
that in any such market, improving social welfare must necessarily be traded off with volatility in prices,
i.e., it is impossible to reduce volatility in the price of electricity without sacrificing social welfare. In
the context of renewable power sources, our investigation uncovers an intriguing phenomenon we term
the volatility cliff, which suggests that with increasing penetration of intermittent renewable production,
price volatility could increase to unacceptable levels, prompting the need for a complete restructuring of
existing electricity markets.
Index terms— Linear quadratic regulators, stochastic control, smart grids, constrained Markov decision
processes, Markets with friction, price volatility, renewable energy, spot pricing, real time markets.
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1 Introduction
The Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) is one of the cornerstones of optimal control theory [KV15, Ber95].
It is concerned with operating a linear dynamical system in such a way as to minimize a cost functional
that is quadratic in the system state and control input. Over the years, the LQR has been used as an
analytical model in fields as varied as aeronautical engineering [BA10], chemical engineering [BBB+01] and
economic theory [CS12, C+75]. The dynamical system in the LRQ model can evolve in either discrete time
or continuous time and this problem has been subjected to extensive investigation in both [KV15].
In this article we are concerned with the temporal volatility of the regulator’s control process in discrete
time LQRs. It is well known that, despite being mathematically sound, highly volatile control laws are
undesirable from an engineering perspective [Gao04]. The high frequency switching these laws entail are
difficult to implement and tend to excite undesired second-order dynamics [BAN+19]. Indeed frequent and
abrupt switching in bang-bang control for example, invariably leads to a phenomenon called “control signal
chattering” [GH04], that tends to rapidly wear out actuators. The deleterious effects of wide temporal swings
in the control input manifest in myriad ways depending on the application. In fact, in the sequel, we will
provide multiple examples of this phenomenon from the field of economic theory. Our investigation in this
paper unearths a surprising and very fundamental connection between the aforementioned cost functional
and the temporal variations of the control law. We initially show that optimally controlling the system
always implies high levels of control volatility. Thereafter, we extend this result to show that no admissible1
control can simultaneously achieve low volatility and low cost. We then use these results to help explain the
phenomenon of price volatility in deregulated electricity markets.
1.1 Price Volatility in Deregulated Markets
The deregulated electricity market in the United States is managed by two types of profit-neutral entities
called Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). These
entities are primarily responsible for the reliability of the power grid, resource planning i.e., keeping the
power grid balanced between generation (supply) and load (demand), and determining electricity prices
which, in turn, heavily influence supply, demand and future investment in the power sector. In fact, there is
general consensus that setting real-time prices that reflect current operating conditions has multiple positive
effects on the market such as the potential to reduce supplier ancillary cost and improving system efficiency
[DoE06]. Consequently, the price of electricity, which we shall also refer to as the price signal, has assumed
critical importance in wholesale power markets [Hog10].
However, in the years following the deregulation of the electricity market, volatile electricity prices have
turned into an epidemic showing jumps of up to 300% over periods as short as one hour [gro15], and
this phenomenon has been highlighted by researchers as a feature of the market [CM10, BMPV02, Rob05,
KM10a] rather than due to isolated cases of exercise of market power such as that involving the Enron
Corporation [Fox03]. European markets, as seen in Fig. 1, have been experiencing similar fluctuations
in prices. Additionally, accounting for transmission constraints across the grid and demand uncertainty
localization has resulted in sharp geographical price variations. This mechanism, called Locational Marginal
Pricing (LMP) can result in dramatic disparities in electricity prices such as in June 2010, when the price
across a single RTO (the Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland Power Pool or PJM) varied by 635.65% [Ore].
Widespread adoption of “green” renewable energy sources such as windmills and photovoltaic (PV) cells is
beginning to exacerbate this problem and has even led to long periods of negative electricity prices [Goe, ale],
with suppliers paying to keep their generation plants running. Fig. 2 illustrates the infamous “duck curve”
1See Sec. 2 for the definition of admissibility.
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Figure 1: Market volatility of electricity prices in European power markets in 2009. The figure compares prices in four
electricity exchanges namely, the Austrian energy exchange (red), European power exchange (EPEX) Germany (gray), EPEX
France (yellow) and the APX group (blue). Of particular interest is the EPEX Germany price curve that fluctuates much more
than 300% in Oct 2009 alone. Source: Wikimedia Commons [fEA].
that regularly occurs in locations such as within the California ISO, where a substantial amount of solar
electric capacity has been installed [DOBJ15]. Following periods of high solar generation during daytime,
power suppliers need to rapidly increase their output using conventional sources (such as natural gas) around
sunset to compensate for the sudden fall in solar power levels. This precipitous increase in demand only
adds to the fluctuations in electricity prices. While improvements in grid energy storage technologies such
as battery storage, pumped storage hydroelectricity and compressed air look promising, they suffer from
multiple limitations such as prohibitively high investment costs, efficiency, need for appropriate geography,
environmental impacts etc., and do not appear to be capable of solving the volatility problem at least in
the near future [Wik19c, YJ11, Wik19a]. It is notable that, since the late 1990s, all these price variations
have resulted in an estimated $45 billion in lost business from long blackouts, higher electricity costs and
weakening economic growth in California alone [Rob05].
Analysis of this volatility phenomenon has received some attention in recent times. The work in [CM10,
KM10a] considered continuous time markets with friction, i.e., bounded rate of change of generation and/or
demand, and showed that the optimal price signal, while not harming (a suitably defined notion of) social
utility2, does tend to fluctuate widely. The former article accounts only for supply-side friction and demon-
strates using a stylized model, that the utility optimizing price tends to show extreme fluctuations in time.
The latter expands this model to include demand-side friction in a market with Brownian activation, and
demonstrates a similar result. [KM10a] also shows a tradeoff between social utility and price volatility for
this optimal market price process.
Two points are of interest here. Firstly, RTOs and ISOs run electricity markets at a minimum temporal
granularity of about 5-15 minutes [RDM12, YO16]. This means that generation, demand and prices, even
in real-time markets, are reevaluated only every 5-15 minutes3. These markets, therefore, are not modeled
well with continuous time dynamics and require a discrete time model for analysis. But this immediately
renders the proof techniques in the aforementioned work unusable and we, in the current article, develop
entirely new analytical machinery specifically for markets that operate in discrete time. Secondly, neither of
these articles comments about the volatility behavior of other pricing policies. In the present article, we go
2We use the terms “social welfare” and “social utility”interchangeably.
3In fact, this is true in most regions of the United States such as New England, the PJM and California [RDM12]
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Figure 2: The infamous California ISO “Duck curve.” The orange plot represents the aggregate power generated over a period
of 24 hours by renewable sources (wind and solar), while the blue plot represents the total demand on the system. The gray
curve at the bottom shows the contribution from solar power sources. As renewable sources proliferate, this effect is expected
to only worsen, as evidenced by states such as Hawaii, where a more pronounced version of this phenomenon, called the “Nessie
curve” has been observed [Joh]. Source: Wikimedia Commons [Rei].
further and show that volatility and social utility necessarily have to be traded off regardless of what pricing
policy is used. We also completely characterize the space of (volatility,utility) tuples achievable in any given
market. We hope that, akin to what the Shannon capacity region [CT12] did for communication systems,
this result will help guide the development of pricing policies for such markets in general.
The electricity market is modeled as a deterministic discrete time dynamical system without supply-side
friction in [RDM12]. The article analyzes social cost minimization under market clearing constraints, de-
fines a Lyapunov stability notion for the price process and derives conditions under which stability can be
guaranteed. It also defines two notions of volatility: aggregate and time averaged, for price, demand and gen-
eration processes, and shows that when market dynamics satisfy certain smoothness assumptions, bounded
volatility can be guaranteed. [WMO14] considers a deterministic finite time horizon (market closes after T
time slots) market with a single supplier and multiple consumers. It defines a bounded quasilinear model of
consumer utility (i.e., Consumer i consumes at most di units over T slots), and derives a pricing mechanism
to maximize social utility under an appropriately defined price fluctuation penalty. [WMO14] also provides
a subgradient descent-based algorithm for implementing utility maximization in a decentralized manner.
More recently, [SKX18] has adopted a game theoretic approach to solve this problem in the absence of the
knowledge of consumer preferences (utility functions).
Turning to geographic price volatility, [YO16] adopts a stochastic control-based approach to analyze the
impact of grid storage in mitigating sharp fluctuations in Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP). Increase in
price variability due to widespread adoption of renewable sources could be observed as far back as 2011, when
empirical studies analyzing spot-price variance using data from the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT) concluded that increased adoption of wind-based power sources tends to decrease spot prices on
an average, but increases their temporal variability [WHMP11], i.e., prices tend to fluctuate more widely
and faster. More recently, similar analysis of data from the California ISO also draws similar conclusions
[Jos19].
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1.2 Our contributions and organization
We now provide a road-map of the rest of the article together with a summary of our contributions.
• We begin with the Linear Quadratic Regulator model in Sec. 2. We define notions of “admissibility”
of a control policy, “regulator efficiency” and “control volatility” that we analyze in depth in future
sections of the paper.
• We then study a tradeoff between the aforementioned regulator efficiency and volatility of the control
law in Sec. 3. We prove that penalizing volatility in the optimal (in the sense of minimizing cost)
control process automatically penalizes efficiency. We then provide a complete characterization of the
set of all achievable (volatility, efficiency) tuples for any given LQR (Sec. 4) which we call the capacity
region associated with the LQR. This automatically gives rise to a “No free lunch” theorem that states
that no admissible control policy can simultaneously achieve low volatility and low cost.
• We then use the above results to explain the dramatic levels of price fluctuations in real-time electricity
markets in the United States and Europe (Sec. 5). Next, we analyze the effect of decarbonization,
i.e., drastically increasing dependence on intermittent solar and wind generation, on price volatility
(Sec. 5.2). Our study suggests the occurrence of a volatility cliff phenomenon which predicts that,
with increasing penetration of intermittent renewable production, price fluctuation could increase to
unacceptable levels. Echoing the assertions made in [Jos19] for renewed interest in electricity market
reform, we hope that this result aids in convincing the reader of the need for a complete revamp of the
existing electricity market structure to handle large-scale adoption of intermittent power sources.
• We then present simulations to help illustrate our results in Sec. 6. Finally, we provide concluding
remarks and discuss possible directions for future work (Sec. 7).
2 The LQR Model and Preliminaries
The state of the system under study at time t ∈ N = {0, 1, · · · }, is denoted by xt and evolves in Rd according
to the following law
xt+1 = Axt + but + nt, t ∈ N. (SYS)
We now proceed to explain the various elements of the above evolution equation. Here, ut ∈ R is the
control input deployed in time slot t, and nt ∈ Rd models random state disturbance. The system gain and
control coefficient matrices are denoted by A ∈ Rd×d and b ∈ Rd×1, respectively. The state disturbance
process {nt}t∈N comprises IID random vectors drawn from some distribution Fn over Rd with Ent = 0 and
Ψn := EntnTt . The single stage cost is defined by
g(xt, ut) := x
T
t Qxt︸ ︷︷ ︸
state penalizing
+ r u2t︸︷︷︸
control penalizing
, t ∈ N, (1)
where the matrix Q is assumed to be symmetric positive semidefinite (SPSD). Clearly, the first term in Eqn. 1
(i.e., xTt Qxt) penalizes the state while the latter penalizes the control input ut. The control penalizing
parameter (or control penalty coefficient) r > 0 in (1) will be of particular interest to us in subsequent
sections. Given a discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1), the control input is to be designed to minimize a γ-discounted
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cost defined by (we suppress the dependence of Jr(·) on γ for ease of exposition)
Jr(x0) := E
∞∑
t=0
γtg(xt, ut)
= E
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
xTt Qxt + r u
2
t
)
, (2)
where the expectation is over both the state disturbance and the (possibly randomized) controls {ut}∞t=0.
In (2), we have made explicit the fact that the cost functional Jr(·) depends on the control penalizing
parameter r in anticipation of results to follow that will explore the impact of control penalization on various
performance metrics. Note that the tuple (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ) completely characterizes this LQR system. We
denote by P(R) the set of all probability distributions on R.
For every t ∈ N, let Ft denote the sigma algebra generated by {xs, us, s < t} ∪ {xt}. Throughout the
article, we will only work with nonanticipatory controls, i.e., those that, at time t, use only the information
available up to t and are of the form ut : Ft → P(R). Restricting our attention to Markov controls,
ut = µt(xt), t ∈ N, where µt : Rd → P(R) we define a (Markov) policy pi to be a time indexed sequence of
such maps pi = [µ0, µ1, · · · ]. If the constituent maps are independent of time, the control policy is said to
be stationary, in which case pi = [µ, µ, · · · ]. We denote by Π the set of all (nonanticipatory) policies for this
system, by F ⊂ Π the set of all stationary policies and D ⊂ F, the set of all stationary deterministic policies.
The probability measure on the space of sample paths induced by policy pi beginning in state x0 is denoted
by Ppix0 and the associated expectation operator by E
pi
x0 . The optimal cost functional is defined by
J∗r (x0) := inf
pi∈Π
Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
xTt Qxt + r u
2
t
)
. (3)
Using Propositions 3.1.3 and 3.1.5 in [Ber11] we see that the optimal policy pi∗ = [µ∗, µ∗, · · · ] for this system
is stationary and given by
u∗t = µ
∗(x) = −γ 1
γbtKb + r
btKAx, (4)
where K is an SPSD matrix that satisfies the recursion
K = Q+AT
[
γK − 1
γbTKb + r
γ2KbbTK
]
A. (5)
A unique solution to (5) exists (and is, in fact, positive definite) provided the pair (A, b) is controllable and
the pair (A,C) is observable [Ber95, Prop. 4.1], where C =
√
ΛM and Λ and M are diagonal and orthogonal
matrices respectively such that Q = MTΛM . Therefore, for the rest of the paper we have
Assumption 2.1. The system (A,b) is controllable and the pair (A,C) is observable4.
Under Assumption 2.1, the optimal cost is given by
J∗r (x0) = x
T
0 Kx0 +
γ
1− γEn
TKn, ∀x0 ∈ R3, (6)
where n ∼ Fn, the state disturbance distribution.
4In fact, observability is easily guaranteed by choosingQ to be positive definite, which can be ensured by minimally perturbing
the chosen Q with a scaled identity matrix.
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Given any pricing policy pi := [u0, u1, · · · ] for the above system, define the Volatility of a policy by
Vx0(pi) := Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γtu2t . (7)
Also define Regulator Efficiency or System Efficiency under pi by
Ex0(pi) := −Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γtxTt Qxt. (8)
We will call a control policy pi ∈ Π admissible if it the cost and volatility functionals are well defined under
pi and denote by A ⊂ Π the subset of all admissible policies. Finally, we define a Bellman Operator as
follows. Let S = Rd× (0,∞) and let J = {v | v : S → R} be the space5 of all functionals on S. The Bellman
Operator T : J→ J is given by
(Tv)(x, r) := xTQx + inf
u∈R
r u2 + γEnv(Ax + bu+ n, r). (9)
Having constructed the requisite theoretical scaffolding we will now move on to deriving a formal relationship
between control fluctuations and system efficiency. Please note that we have provided a glossary of notation
for the convenience of the reader in Sec. 8.1 in the Appendix.
3 Regulator Efficiency vs Control Volatility
We begin this section with Thm. 3.1 wherein we show that the optimal cost function, J∗r , satisfies two
important properties. Aided by this result, we then show that there exists a fundamental tradeoff between
the volatility and efficiency functionals defined in Eqns. (7) and (8) under the control policy pi∗ that achieves
the optimal cost (3). Next, invoking Thm. 3.1, we show that there exists a fundamental relation between
the system efficiency that a control policy can achieve and its volatility. We also characterize the space of
all (volatility,efficiency) pairs that can be achieved by any admissible control mechanism in a given LQR
(A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ).
This latter result is of practical importance since it can be used to inform the controller about the conse-
quences of policy decisions on system efficiency. On the flip side, it is also useful to know in advance, how
much price volatility one can expect while attempting to achieve a desired efficiency level. We now discuss
two important properties of J∗r .
Theorem 3.1. J∗r (x) is concave and nondecreasing in r. Specifically,
dJ∗r (x)
dr
> 0, and
d2J∗r (x)
dr2
≤ 0, ∀x ∈ R3.
(10)
Proof. The proof proceeds in several steps. We first define a norm ‖‖ : J→ R+ by
‖v‖ := sup
y∈S
|v(y)|
(‖y‖2 ∨ 1)2
, (11)
5We use “space” instead of “set” because we will convert J to a metric space shortly.
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and let V := {v ∈ J : ‖v‖ < ∞}. Clearly, J∗r ∈ V. This norm induces a metric ρ : V × V → R+ defined by
ρ(v, w) = ‖v − w‖. Before proceeding further we first note that
Lemma 3.2. 〈V, ρ〉 is a complete metric space, and v ∈ V ⇒ Tv ∈ V, i.e., the Bellman operator preserves
finiteness of ‖‖ .
Proof. See Sec. 8.2 in the Appendix.
Next, we characterize the subspace of all v ∈ V that are nondecreasing and concave.
Lemma 3.3. Let H := {v ∈ V : v is concave and nondecreasing}. Then,
1. H is a closed subset of V, where closure is in the topology induced by ρ, and
2. v ∈ H⇒ Tv ∈ H.
Proof. See Sec. 8.3 in the Appendix.
We now note that (a) the function v0(y) := 0, ∀y ∈ S is in H, (b) that J∗ is a fixed point of the operator
T and observe the following
Lemma 3.4. limk→∞ T kv0 = J∗, where convergence is in the topology induced by ρ.
Proof. See Sec. 8.4 in the Appendix.
The above lemma, together with the fact that H is closed, means that J∗ ∈ H. Furthermore, it is evident
that r 7→ J∗r (x) ∈ C2 ((0,∞)) , whence we have (10). This concludes the proof.
The simulation result in Fig. 4 shows the concavity of J∗r for the market specified in Sec. 8.10. Now, Thm. 3.1
has several consequences. To begin with, we show in Sec. 3.1 that it implies a fundamental tradeoff between
Efficiency and Volatility for policy pi∗ defined in (4). Specifically, we will now show that the efficiency
functional with pi∗, i.e., Ex0(pi∗) decreases with decreasing volatility, which means that improving optimal
system efficiency always comes at the cost of increased control volatility. However, in Sec. 4 we go even further
and prove a stronger claim that this volatility-efficiency tradeoff must be satisfied by every admissible control
policy.
3.1 The Volatility-Efficiency tradeoff
Recall that the first term in the single stage cost was called the state penalizing portion (see Eqn. (1)) and
consider the impact of employing the policy given in (4) on this cost alone, i.e., on
Jsp,r(x0) := E
∞∑
t=0
γtxTt Qxt = −Ex0(pi∗), (12)
where the subscript sp stands for “state penalizing.” We show, in Prop. 8.1 in the Appendix, that this cost
is given by
Jsp,r(x0) = x
T
0 Sx0 +
γ
1− γEn
TSn, (13)
where S is an SPSD matrix that satisfies
S = Q+ γ
(
AT
[
I − γ 1
γbTKb + r
KbbT
]
× S
[
I − γ 1
γbTKb + r
bbTK
]
A
)
. (14)
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Proposition 3.5. Under Assumption 2.1, a unique symmetric positive definite matrix satisfying (14) exists.
Moreover, the sequence of matrices generated by
St+1 = Q+ γ
(
AT
[
I − γ 1
γbTKb + r
KbbT
]
× St
[
I − γ 1
γbTKb + r
bbTK
]
A
)
. (15)
with S0 set to any SPSD matrix, satisfies
lim
t→∞ ‖ St − S ‖F= 0, (16)
where S is the solution of (14) and ‖M ‖F is the Frobenius norm of matrix M.
Proof. We first show in Prop. 8.1 in the Appendix, that Jsp,r satisfies a Bellman-like fixed point equation
which then gives us (13) . Thereafter, we modify a general technique used in the analysis of Riccatti equations
to first prove convergence in the Frobenius norm of (15) when initialized with S0 = [0]3×3 and extend the
result to S0 being any arbitrary SPSD matrix. Finally, we show that the limit point has to be unique. See
Sec. 8.6 in the Appendix for details.
Returning to (13), we now show that similar to our original cost functional J∗r (), the state penalizing
functional is also concave nondecreasing in r, that is
Theorem 3.6 (V-E tradeoff). Jsp,r(x) is concave nondecreasing in r. Specifically,
dJsp,r(x)
dr
> 0, and
d2Jsp,r(x)
dr2
≤ 0, ∀x ∈ R3.
(17)
Proof. The proof uses the ideas in the proof of Thm. 3.1, along with the fact that beginning with any
SPSD matrix, the iterates in (15) converge in the Frobenius norm. Details can be found in Sec. 8.7 in the
Appendix.
Since state penalizing cost is defined to be the negative of the efficiency functional in Eqn. (12), Thm. 3.6
shows that efficiency increases with increasing volatility, establishing the volatility-efficiency tradeoff. We
thus see that operating an LQR at high efficiency automatically entails highly volatile control inputs. The
simulation results presented in Sec.6 illustrate this phenomenon very clearly.
4 The Capacity Region for Linear Quadratic Regulators and A “No
Free Lunch” theorem
The discussion hitherto centered around optimal control inputs, which naturally indicates the possibility of
the existence of such a relationship for other control policies. In this section, we answer that question in the
affirmative. Suppose we impose upon the stochastic control problem described in Sec. 2, the constraint that
the volatility of the control law must not exceed a certain threshold α > 0, i.e., that
Vx0(pi) = Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γtu2t ≤ α, ∀x0 ∈ Rd. (18)
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For a given level α > 0, we define Aα ⊂ A to be the set of all policies whose volatility is less than α and
call these policies α-admissible. The policy that attains maximum efficiency, if it exists, must satisfy
arg max
pi∈Π
−Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γtxTt Qxt
subject to xt+1 = Axt + but + nt, t ∈ N, and (19)
Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γtu2t ≤ α.
Clearly, all feasible solutions to the above problem are α-admissible and hence, the optimizer always lies
withinAα. This problem can be recast in the form of a constrained Markov decision process [Alt99, LMHL03],
and solved with the aid of the Lagrangian L : Π× (0,∞)→ R, defined by
L(pi, λ) := Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γtxTt Qxt + λ
(
Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γtu2t − α
)
= Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
xTt Qxt + λ u
2
t
)− λα, (20)
where we deliberately suppress the dependence of L on x0 for ease of exposition. Note that in (20) the
Lagrangian represents a cost minimization problem rather than an efficiency maximization problem. So our
aim now will be to minimize this Lagrangian. Invoking Theorems 4.2 and 4.4 in [LMHL03], we see that the
optimal cost L∗ for this constrained problem is given by
L∗ = inf
pi∈Π
sup
λ≥0
L(pi, λ) = sup
λ≥0
inf
pi∈Π
L(pi, λ)
= sup
λ≥0
(
inf
pi∈Π
Epix0
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
xTt Qxt + λ u
2
t
))− λα. (21)
We solve for L∗ using this last expression. Notice that keeping λ ≥ 0 fixed and using (6), infpi∈ΠL(pi, λ) =
x0Kλx0 +
γ
1−γEn
TKλn, ∀x0 ∈ Rd, where
Kλ = Q+A
T
[
γK − 1
γbtKb + λ
γ2KbbTK
]
A. (22)
This gives us L∗ = supλ≥0 x0Kλx0 +
γ
1−γEn
TKλn− λα, where n ∼ Fn, the state disturbance distribution.
At the optimal λ, we have x0 dKλdλ x0 +
γ
1−γEn
T dKλ
dλ n = α, but since
d2Kλ
dλ2 ≤ 0, as α decreases, i.e., as we
demand lesser control volatility, the optimal value of λ increases which, as Thm. 3.1 shows, means that
x0Kλx0 +
γ
1−γEn
TKλn increases which results in decreased system efficiency.
However, we can go even further and make a stronger claim. We have already shown that the optimal cost
of the constrained MDP, L∗, is nonincreasing in the price volatility α. Notice that the Lagrangian dual, i.e.,
L∗ = sup
λ≥0
x0Kλx0 +
γ
1− γEn
TKλn− λα, (23)
is convex in α. Therefore, optimal market efficiency E∗x0 = −L∗ is concave in the volatility level α (Fig. 9
helps validate this conclusion experimentally for regulator whose specifications are provided in Sec. 8.10 in
the Appendix). Since E∗x0 is the maximum achievable efficiency for any given α, any other α-admissible
policy pi ∈ Aα will necessarily only achieve lower (or at the very least not higher) efficiency. The foregoing
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arguments appear to suggest that higher efficiency efficiency levels cannot be attained by any policy without
sacrificing price volatility. We now show that this intuition is correct. Consider the tuple (Vx0(pi),Ex0(pi))
for every pi ∈Aα and let
Cα := {(Vx0(pi),Ex0(pi)) : pi ∈Aα} .
We then have the following “no free lunch” theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (LQR Capacity Region). For every LQR (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ), there exists a set C ⊂ R2
C =
⋃
α>0
Cα, (24)
such that
a. C is closed and convex,
b. the Pareto boundary of C is given by the optimal efficiency E∗x0 , and
c. for every pi ∈A, the tuple (Vx0(pi),Ex0(pi)) ∈ C.
Proof. The proof essentially involves showing that the set of all achievable (volatility, efficiency) tuples
is contained in C and later, that every point in C is achievable. Details are presented in Sec. 8.8 in the
Appendix.
Fig. 3 illustrates the set C and the Pareto boundary for a given regulator (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ). Since this region
completely determines all achievable efficiencies under every acceptable level of price volatility, we call C the
Capacity Region of the market (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ), similar to the Shannon capacity region for the physical
layer [CT12] and the Tassiulas-Ephremides capacity region for the MAC layer [TE90] of a communication
system. An example of such a region is shown through simulations in Fig. 9 in Sec. 6 for a particular
regulator. This region is especially useful for estimating an upper bound on the efficiency achievable both
by different regulators and by various control mechanisms for a given system.
In Sec. 5 we discuss the consequences of the results in the foregoing sections on deregulated electricity
markets, which will help concretely illustrate their impact in real-world scenarios. We begin Sec. 5 by
deriving a model for such markets, which will help translate Theorems 3.6 and 4.1 to the deregulated market
setting. Thereafter, the same analysis will also help explain certain volatility phenomena observed in regions
with high penetration of renewable energy sources.
5 Applications to the Analysis of Deregulated Electricity Markets
As mentioned in Sec. 1, deregulated electricity markets in Europe and the United States are managed by
two types of profit-neutral entities called Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs). RTOs and ISOs manage the power grid via two sub-markets: Day Ahead Markets
and Real Time Markets that operate on time scales that range from 24 hours to 5 minutes. Electricity
markets, therefore, are naturally amenable to being modeled as time-slotted systems. Note that linear
dynamical system models have often been used to model markets with friction in general and electricity
markets in particular in the literature [A+97, Alv99, WA04, NP09], including the linear quadratic cost
model [MA02, OMHU13, KM10a, BS89, KM11].
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constrained MDP (21). No (V, E) pair outside C is achievable in this system.
The state of the system under study at time t ∈ N = {0, 1, · · · }, is described by the (demand, supply, price)
tuple denoted by xt = [dt, st, pt]T and evolves in R3 according to the following law (akin to Eqn. (SYS))
xt+1 = Axt + but + nt, t ∈ N. (25)
As is quite common in economic literature [CM10, KM10a], the quantities dt and st represent the aggregate
of a continuum of infinitesimally small, identical consumers and energy suppliers. In the sequel, we deal
with aggregate demand and supply. Taking into consideration standard facts in microeconomic theory that
demand decreases with price and supply increases with price [MCWG+95], the matrix A is of the form
(β, σ, φ1, φ2 below represent nonnegative reals)
A =
β 0 −φ10 σ φ2
0 0 1
 , (26)
and b = [0, 0, 1]T . The regulatory authority (ISO or RTO) controls the price of electricity by tweaking the
control input ut in each time slot and the suppliers and consumers are coupled through this price. Therefore,
ut controls the rate of change of the price of electricity. The use of market price as a coordinating mechanism
began with the seminal work of Walras [Wal13], and there have since been multiple attempts to apply this
theory to analyze electricity markets [Hog92, CBS82, BCS84]. Here, the ISO or the RTO plays the role of a
coordinating agent and, being profit-neutral, is only allowed to control the system through the price signal.
This constraint is reflected in the value of b = [0, 0, 1]T . In the sequel, we will assume that the matrix A
along with disturbance covariance matrix Σ := EntnTt are known to the RTO/ISO.
The definitions of the cost, volatility and efficiency functionals remain unchanged, but we will refer to them in
this section and Sec. 6 as Social Cost, Price Volatility and Market Efficiency respectively. Market Efficiency
(Ex0(·)) is a notion of social welfare. This, therefore, is something the regulatory authority (RTO/ISO) must
attempt to maximize using a suitable pricing mechanism.
Before we discuss optimal pricing policies, we note that Observability is easily guaranteed by choosing Q
to be positive definite, which can be ensured by minimally perturbing the chosen Q with a scaled identity
matrix. The resulting quadratic cost functional, given, as in Sec. 2, by
Jr(x0) = E
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
xTt Qxt + r u
2
t
)
, (27)
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has been employed in the literature as a differentiable (and hence, more tractable) approximation to other
more general cost functions (see for example, [KM10b, Sec. IV]). To guarantee Controllability, requires the
matrix C0 = [b Ab A2b] is required to be full rank. In our case,
C0 =
0 φ1 φ1(β + 1)0 −φ2 −φ2(σ + 1)
1 1 1
 .
This matrix is full rank when β 6= σ, which is the case in practice, since demand and supply rarely decrease
or increase at exactly the same rate.
5.1 Price Volatility and Market Efficiency
In Sec. 1 we mentioned how, over the years, electricity prices in deregulated markets have displayed unac-
ceptable levels of volatility. Equipped with the model considered in this paper and the results we derived
in Sections 3 and 4, we can help explain why this happens. To begin with, consider the implications of
Thm. 3.6 in the present context. With regards to deregulated markets, the result essentially means that
efficiency increases with increasing volatility, establishing a clear volatility-efficiency tradeoff. We thus see
that operating an electricity market at high efficiency automatically entails highly volatile prices. The sim-
ulation results presented in Sec.6 illustrate this phenomenon very clearly. So the aforementioned volatility
in market prices is actually a natural outcome of attempting to improve market efficiency.
Moving on to Thm. 4.1, we see that with every Market (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ), is associated a region C ⊂ R2 such
that all achievable (V olatility, Efficiency) pairs lie within C and, in keeping with our nomenclature, we
term this set the Capacity Region of Market (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ). This latter result is of practical importance
since it can be used to inform RTOs and ISOs about the consequences of price control policy decisions on
market efficiency. Pricing policies are the outcome of decisions made within federal and local governments,
and this analysis helps quantify the social impact such decisions entail. In general, these consequences are
not very easy to judge off-hand. One recent example is the enormous price spike experienced by ERCOT
where price capping and scarcity pricing policies lead to electricity being priced at $9000/MWh and yet,
defenders of the policy cited it as “a more efficient system” [Dap].
5.2 Effects of Decarbonization
In recent times, rejecting an incremental approach to solving climate change, undertakings such as the Deep
Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDP) have focused on introducing drastic reductions in dependence on
carbon-based fuel sources [Wik19b, PB16]. In Sec. 1, we outlined the deleterious effects that the entry of
renewable energy sources can have on electricity prices. We now quantify the effects of endeavours such as
the DDP on existing electricity markets using a modified system model, to incorporate these intermittent
power sources and, in doing so, uncover a phenomenon we call a “volatility cliff.”
The output of a renewable energy source is highly dependent on ambient weather conditions. Solar power
generation (even with controllable solar panels) is almost entirely at the mercy of the sun and local cloud
cover. Similarly, windmills produce more power when the weather is windy. Taking this unique difficulty
in controlling the output of these sources into consideration, we model renewable sources in the supply as a
controlled random walk as follows
yt+1 = σryt + σcpt + wt, t ≥ 0. (28)
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Here, at time t, yt is the aggregate output of installed renewable sources, pt is the price control signal, wt
is the state disturbance and σr and σc are a positive constants. The price coefficient σc is a small positive
constant used to model whatever rudimentary control the price signal can have over renewable supply. To
incorporate this new evolution and keep the controlled process Markovian, we define the new system state
vector to be zt = [dt, st, pt, yt]T , t ≥ 0. We note that the state now evolves in R4 as opposed to the state in
(SYS) that evolved in R3. Therefore, the evolution equation (SYS) is modified to
zt+1 = Arzt + brut + n
(r)
t , t ≥ 0, (REN)
where
Ar =
 A a(1)r(
a
(2)
r
)T
σr

4×4
,
br = [0, 0, 1, 0]
T , and the state disturbance n(r)t = [ntwt]T consists of IID random vectors with En
(r)
t = 0
and En(r)t (n
(r)
t )
T = Ψ
(r)
n . The vector a
(1)
r = [0, 1, 0]T , a
(2)
r = [0, 0, σc]
T and, assuming the state disturbance
for supply, demand and renewables are independent of each other, the covariance matrix Ψ(r)n is a diagonal
matrix, with diagonal entries6 [ψd, ψs, 0, ψr]. Single stage cost is defined, as before, to be g(zt, ut) = zTt Qz+
r u2t , t ≥ 0, and the cost functional J (ren)r and efficiency E(ren) are both defined as before, replacing x with
z.
As renewable supplies proliferate (a) the aggregate supply from these sources obviously increases and (b)
supplied power becomes more volatile. The factor in Eqn. (REN) that captures both of these effects is the
renewable supply variance ψr. As the contribution of renewables increases, so does ψr. We then have the
following result for the system (REN).
Proposition 5.1. Consider two renewable sources with supply variance ψ(1)r and ψ
(2)
r . Also denote the price
volatility of the system using renewable Source i by V∗i , i = 1, 2. Then, if ψ
(1)
r < ψ
(2)
r , V∗1 < V
∗
2 .
Proof. See Sec. 8.9 in the Appendix.
Prop. 5.1 leads us to conclude that as renewable energy sources become more widespread in the power grid,
increased variability of prices in the current market structure is inevitable. This, then adds to the arguments
presented in recent studies such as [Jos19] that call for a restructuring of the electricity market including
and especially the pricing pricing process.
In fact, as the result of simulating this system shows in Fig. 10, the effect is even more pernicious, in that
increasing the fraction of renewable supply in the market causes the entire market capacity region to shrink.
However, we reiterate that the results in this and the next section are not intended to stymie efforts towards
decarbonization. Rather, they seek to highlight how the current market model might be insufficient to handle
emerging green technologies such as wind and photovoltaic power supplies.
6 Numerical results
We now discuss the results of various simulation experiments conducted to support the theory we have
developed in earlier sections. We begin with simulating the Linear Quadratic Regulator in (SYS). The
6We assume the price process is completely under the control of the regulatory authority and hence, doesn’t have any noise
in its evolution.
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LQR evolves in R8, and the entries of the system parameters (A8×8,b8×1, Q8×8) are sampled according
to the standard normal distribution. The state disturbance process is assumed to be IID Gaussian, i.e.,
Fn ≡ N(0, I8×8), and the discount factor γ = 0.5. The simulation results shown in Fig. 4 help corroborate
Thm. 3.1 and Thm. 3.6. Since the control input to the system is implicitly constrained while using large
values of r, even though the control signal shows little volatility, the state variables show larger fluctuations,
increasing the state penalizing portion in every time slot (Fig. 7 and its accompanying explanation illustrate
this phenomenon quite clearly). Furthermore, comparing Equations (3) and (12) we see that the optimal cost
function J∗r (·) includes a non negative control penalty term in addition to the state penalty, which makes it
the larger of the two metrics. As can be seen in the figure, both J∗r (·) and the state penalizing cost function
Jsp,r(·) are increasing and concave in the control penalty coefficient r.
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Figure 4: Variation of the two cost functionals the optimal cost J∗r and the state penalizing cost Jsp,r as functions of the control
penalty r under the optimal pricing policy pi∗ in (4). In this simulation, xt ∈ R8. The plot shows that both J∗r and Jsp,r are
concave and increasing in r. Note that both curves have been normalized to lie in [0, 1].
Next, we move on to a more concrete example of a market, where the state xt = [dt, st, pt] evolves in R3.
Fig. 7 shows the effect of the control penalty coefficient r in (1). Two sample paths of the state of the market
xt are shown with Fig. 5 demonstrating the effects of light control penalty (r = 0.01) and Fig. 6, the effects
of heavy control penalty (r = 103). In both cases, we begin with the same initial condition x0 = [25, 25, 50],
but owing to the effect of the control penalty, the sample paths differ significantly in their evolution. When
r is small, since large values of price control ut are not penalized much, the price signal can be varied much
more freely with the result that the market is more “stable,” in the sense that demand and supply do not
fluctuate wildly over time.
The opposite is true in Fig. 6. When r = 103, the regulatory authority is highly constrained in the control
that it can exercise upon the price signal and, consequently, the market is also less stable with demand
and supply varying much more with time. For the sample paths in Fig. 6, the price volatility V (defined
in Eqn. 7) when r = 0.01 is 862.16, which is significantly larger than the volatility level of 0.07 obtained
with r = 103. Thus, the experiment clearly shows that imposing a heavier control penalty (1) reduces price
fluctuations, but (2) increases demand and supply volatility, which is essentially what Thm. 3.1 asserts.
Moving on to market capacity regions, for a given electricity market (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ), define for every price
volatility level α, the function
qα(λ) = x0Kλx0 +
γ
1− γEn
TKλn− λα. (29)
We see that the optimal value of the constrained MDP L∗ = supλ≥0 qα(λ) (see Eqns. (20) and (21)). The
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Figure 7: State dynamics with varying control penalty coefficient r. In Fig. 5, the control penalty is small and variations in the
price process {pt, t ≥ 0} and control {ut, t ≥ 0} are large, while in Fig. 6, since control fluctuations are being heavily penalized,
price fluctuates less.
arguments presented in Sec. 4 and in Thm. 4.1 show that both qα() and L∗ are concave functions of λ and
α respectively. Figures 8 and 9 show that this is indeed true.
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Figure 8: Illustrating the behavior of the function qα, defined in Eqn. (29), for the market whose parameters are given in
Sec. 8.10, at α = 27. The function, as argued in Sec. 4, is concave in λ. The value of the constrained MDP for a given
acceptable volatility level α, L∗(α) = supλ≥0 qα(λ), is also shown in the figure.
Fig. 9 shows the capacity region associated with two markets with γ = 0.5 and γ = 0.9 respectively. For
a given value of α, suppose that the optimal control with γ = 0.9 is
(
u
(0.9)
t
)∞
t=0
and L∗0.9 is the optimal
cost. When this same control is used in a market with γ = 0.5 starting with the same initial conditions, the
resulting sample paths are identical, but the cost only reduces, since γ has reduced. But since applying the
optimal control
(
u
(0.5)
t
)∞
t=0
can only further reduce cost, the efficiency with the latter discount factor must
be larger, giving rise to a bigger capacity region. We see Fig. 9 bearing this out. Note that in Fig. 9, the
maximum attainable efficiency curve E∗x0 has been normalized to peak at 1 for γ = 0.5. We also refer to this
curve as the “Pareto Boundary” since no achievable vector can give strictly greater efficiency for a given level
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of volatility. The region below the E∗x0 curve, shaded blue and pink, are the capacity regions of the markets,
i.e., every (V,E) tuple in these regions is achievable by some admissible policy.
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Figure 9: The capacity regions with discount factor γ = 0.5 and γ = 0.9 (normalized to peak at 1 with γ = 0.5) for the markets
whose parameters (A,Fn, Q) are given in Sec. 8.10. The control penalty is set to r = 0.01. The Pareto boundary is defined by
the optimal volatility function E∗. The regions below these boundaries, shaded blue and pink, are the capacity regions with
γ = 0.5 and γ = 0.9 respectively.
In Sec. 5.2 we described the deleterious effects that unchecked penetration of renewable energy sources can
have on market efficiency and price volatility. Recall that in Prop. 5.1, we already argued why increasing
renewable supply penetration (modeled by increasing ψr) results in higher price volatility. Here, we go further
and present a simulation supporting a stronger claim. Let C(ψr) denote the capacity region associated with
renewables penetration level of ψr = Ew2t , where the latter is defined in (28). Fig. 10 illustrates precisely
how quickly the achievable efficiency is lost when renewable sources increase in the current market structure.
As seen in the figure, as ψr, the contribution of renewable sources, increases, the associated capacity regions
shrink, with the loss in capacity becoming much more pronounced with increasing ψr. In the Supplementary
Material, aided by a more realistic market model, we show a starker version of this result (see Sec. 9). These
observations add to the increasing groundswell in support of fundamental restructuring of electricity markets
to survive the imminent influx of green power generation technologies [Rob, Jos19].
7 Concluding remarks and Future Work
In this paper we presented an analysis of the time slotted Linear Quadratic Regulator with the aim to examine
the volatility behavior of its control policies. We first showed that regulator efficiency and control volatility
are actually inextricably related in a natural tradeoff, where penalizing one is always to the detriment of
the other. We also proved that associated with every LQR, is a capacity region that dictates all (volatility,
efficiency) tuples that can possibly be achieved.
We then applied these results to the analysis of real-time deregulated electricity markets, with the aim to
uncover the reasons for frequently observed sharp fluctuations in market prices. Therein, we showed a similar
tradeoff between social welfare and the volatility of electricity prices. Furthermore, our analysis also showed
that no admissible pricing mechanism can achieve simultaneously high social welfare and low volatility, which
means that efficiently operating such a market will naturally and invariably lead to highly volatile electricity
prices. We also showed that the entry of renewable sources into the market can harm price stability. Going
into a renewables-rich future, we therefore need a firm theoretical scaffolding to help construct a new grid
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Figure 10: The capacity region for the market (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ) shrinks as renewables penetrate the market. We see that as
ψr, the renewable source contribution to the market increases from 0.5 to 8.0, the capacity region shrinks slowly at first, but
rapidly thereafter, until around ψr = 8.0, barely any of the original efficiency (i.e., in C(0.5)) is achievable. The regions have
been normalized such that C(8.0) peaks at 1.
to cope with all these new phenomena.
Going forward, an interesting question that we will attempt to answer is whether this volatility-efficiency
tradeoff is unique to LQRs or do other controlled dynamical systems also exhibit such behavior. In the context
of spot pricing, we studied consumers and producers from a price-taking perspective and did not consider
strategic market players. In most cases this is justifiable, since consumers generally are not interested in
attempting to “game” the system by behaving strategically. Moreover, the aggregate demand and supply (that
we work with) in a sufficiently large RTO/ISO could neutralize strategic effects and render the market immune
to gaming. But in the absence of these factors, collusion and strategic behavior might have undesirable effects
on the market. Therefore, in future work, we will address the issue of strategic consumers and suppliers by
taking a more decentralized approach to the problem, modeling the market as a collection of multiple non-
atomic/non-infinitesimal suppliers and consumers to provide a more nuanced analysis. In this framework,
one could also consider network effects and study price fluctuations across both space (Locational Marginal
Pricing) and time.
One technique proposed in [KDMT16] to handle increasing renewable supply penetration calls for a departure
from what they term the “The Grand Central Optimization” (GCO) paradigm to a “Layered Decentralized
Optimization” (LDO) paradigm. The former, GCO, refers to the existing electricity market structure where
a centralized authority (RTO/ISO) is given all system information and takes all pricing and demand-supply
balance decisions. It is argued in [KDMT16] that as the number of intermittent renewable sources (especially
on the demand side) increases, gathering information about the entire state space in real time and optimizing
over such a large state space might become infeasible. Therefore, a decentralized tiered architecture (LDO)
with hierarchical decision-making entities is designed as an alternative. This new market needs to be analyzed
in greater detail. Further, Dual Pricing is another option that as been explored in the literature, for example
in [KM11], as a potential method to reduce price volatility.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Glossary of Notation
• x = [d, s, p]: the state space of the discrete time market model. comprising demand, supply and price,
respectively.
• N = N ∪ {0} = {0, 1, 2, · · · } the set of natural numbers including 0.
• A: the gain matrix in the state evolution equation (SYS) relating current state to the state in the next
time step.
• b: the coefficient of the price control input in (SYS).
• n: the state disturbance process.
• Fn:the probability distribution function of n.
• Ψn: the covariance matrix of n.
• γ: the discount factor in the Markov decision process formulation (2), γ ∈ (0, 1).
• r: control volatility penalty.
• (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ): a market is fully determined by this tuple.
• Π: the set of all nonanticipatory policies.
• F : the set of all Markov policies.
• D: the set of all deterministic Markov policies.
• A: the set of all admissible policies. Admissibility is defined towards the end of Sec. 2.
• Ppix: the probability measure induced by policy pi on the space of all sample paths, when the initial
state of the system is x.
• Epix: the expectation operator associated with Ppix.
• P(R): the set of all probability distributions on R.
• J∗r : the optimal cost functional for a given value of r.
• Vx(pi): the volatility of the price process under policy pi when the initial state of the system is x defined
in (7)
• Ex(pi): the efficiency achieved by the price process under policy pi when the initial state of the system
is x, defined in (8).
• S = R3 × (0,∞)
• T : the Bellman operator defined in (9).
• Jsp,r: the state penalizing cost defined in (12).
• C: the capacity region of the market (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ).
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8.2 Proof of Lem. 3.2
First note that convergence in ‖ · ‖ implies pointwise convergence. Let v be a limit point of V. Therefore,
there exists a sequence vk, k ≥ 0 in V such that limk→∞ ‖v − vk‖ = 0. But this implies that ‖v‖ ≤
‖v − vk‖+ ‖vk‖ <∞. Hence, v ∈ V. Moreover, v ∈ V ⇒ Tv ∈ V, since
(Tv)(x, r) = xTQx + inf
u∈R
r u2 + γEnv(Ax + bu+ n, r)
≤ xTQx + inf
u∈R
r u2
+γEn‖(Ax + bu+ n)‖2 + r2 + 1 (30)
The RHS of (30) is quadratic in (x, r) and, hence, ‖Tv‖ <∞.
8.3 Proof of Lem. 3.3
The closure of H, i.e., that it contains all its limit points, follows immediately from the observation that
convergence in ‖‖ always implies pointwise convergence. Moving on to the next claim in the Lemma, observe
that ∀v ∈ H and (x, r) ∈ S,
(Tv)(x, r) = xTQx + inf
u∈R
r u2︸︷︷︸
linear in r
+γ Env(Ax + bu+ n, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
concave in r
.
Since Tv is the pointwise infimum of a collection of concave functions, it is itself concave in r. That Tv is
non decreasing whenever v is, follows mutatis mutandis.
8.4 Proof of Lem. 3.4
It is easy to see that, starting with v0, the all zero function7, for ∀t ≥ 0, and ∀(x, r) ∈ S,
T (t+1)v0(x, r) = x
TKtx +
t−1∑
m=0
γk−mEnTKmn,
where, the matrices Kt are defined by
K0 = Q
Kt+1 = Q+A
T
[
γKt − 1
γbtKtb + r
γ2Ktbb
TK
]
A, t ≥ 0.
Also recall from Eqn. (6) that
J∗r (x) = x
TKx +
γ
1− γEn
TKn, ∀(x, r) ∈ S. (31)
7Meaning v0(x, r) = 0, ∀(x, r) ∈ S.
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Therefore, ∣∣∣∣T (t+1)v0(x, r)− J∗r (x)∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣xT (Kt −K)x + k−1∑
m=0
γk−mEnTKmn
− γ
1− γn
TKmn
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣xT (Kt −K)x∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+
∣∣∣∣ k−1∑
m=0
γk−mEnTKmn− γ
1− γn
TKmn︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
∣∣∣∣.
Under observability and controllability, Kt converges pointwise to K [Ber95, Prop. 4.1]. So, coming to term
T1 above, we see that
lim
t→∞ sup(x,r)∈S
|xT (Kt −K)x|
(‖(x, r)‖2 ∨ 1) ≤ limt→∞ ‖ Kt −K ‖F= 0, (32)
where ‖ A ‖F is the Frobenius norm of matrix A. Similarly, T2 vanishes as t → ∞ due to the pointwise
convergence of Kt to K.
8.5 State penalizing cost
Proposition 8.1. The γ-discounted cost of applying the stationary policy pi∗ = [u∗0, u∗1, · · · ] where u∗t (x) =
− 1btKb+rbtKAx, to the system in Eqn. (SYS) with single-stage cost g(xt, ut) = xTt Qxt, t ≥ 0,x ∈ Rd is
given by (14), i.e.,
Jsp,r(x0) = x
T
0 Sx0 +
γ
1− γEn
TSn, (33)
where S satisfies
S = Q+ γAT
[
I − 1
bTKb + r
KbbT
]
S
[
I − 1
bTKb + r
bbTK
]
A.
(34)
Proof. The function Jsp,r(·) is, by definition, the γ-discounted cost of applying the stationary control
u∗t (x) = − 1btKb+rbtKAx to the system in (SYS). Computing Jsp,r, therefore, can be cast as applying pi∗
to a γ-discounted controlled Markov process, specified by
• State space: S = Rd × (0,∞)
• Action space: A = R. Note that U(x, r) = R ∀(x, r) ∈ S.
• Transition probability kernel: Let K = {(y, u) ∈ S × A | u ∈ U(y)} be the set of all admissible
atate-action pairs, and let B(S) be the Borel sigma algebra on S. Then, the transition probability
kernel T : K → [0, 1] is a stochastic kernel on S specified for every ((x, r), u) ∈ K by
T (B | ((x, r), u)) =
∫
(y,s)∈B
I{s=r}dFn (y −Ax− bu) , ∀B ∈ B(S),
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where Fn is the distribution of the state disturbance.
• The Single Stage Cost is a measurable function g : K → R+, defined by g((x, r), u) = xTQx ∀(x, r) ∈ S.
• Discount factor = γ.
The cost of applying pi∗ to this MDP is the state penalizing cost Jsp,r. Since pi∗ is a stationary policy, we
invoke the following from [Ber11, Cor. 3.1.1.1].
Proposition 8.2 ([Ber11]). Let µ be a stationary policy for the above MDP. Suppose the single stage cost
g(x, u) ≥ 0, ∀(x, u) ∈ S × R. Then the cost functional Jµ() associated with µ satisfies
Jµ(x, r) = x
TQx + γEJµ (Ax + bµ(x) + n, r)
This shows that under pi∗, Jsp,r satisfies
Jsp,r(x) = x
TQx + γEnJsp,r (Ax + bu∗(x) + n) . (35)
A substitution argument now shows that Jsp,r(x) = xTSx + γ1−γEn
TSn, where the matrix S satisfies (34).
8.6 Proof of Prop. 3.5
This proof is similar to that of Prop. 4.4.1 in [Ber95] and proceeds in several steps. Recall that the iteration
under study is given by
St+1 = Q+
(
γAT
[
I − γ 1
γbTKb + r
KbbT
]
St
[
I − γ 1
γbTKb + r
bbTK
]
A
)
, t ≥ 0, (36)
with S0 set to any SPSD matrix. We first prove convergence starting with S0 = 03×3, the latter being the
all zeros matrix in R3×3, and then show convergence with an arbitrary initial matrix S0. Since this means
we’ll be dealing with multiple initial conditions for the above iteration, we denote the tth iterate by St(S0)
to make explicit the initial condition. So, for example, the iterate beginning with the all zeros matrix will
be denoted by St(03×3).
Before we begin, notice that under the controllability and observability assumptions, the closed loop (noise-
less) system given by
xt+1 = Axt + but, t ≥ 0 (37)
is stable [Ber95, Prop. 4.4.1 (b)] in the sense that when
ut = −γ 1
γbtKb + r
btKAxt = Gxt,
the matrix
D = G+A =
[
I − γ 1
γbTKb + r
bbTK
]
A (38)
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has all three eigenvalues inside the unit circle. Denote the Jordan decomposition [HJ12, Chap. 3] of D by
D = P−1ΛDP , and note that the previous remark implies that limk→∞Dk = limk→∞ ΛkD = 03×3 (again,
this is entrywise convergence and hence, in Frobenius norm).
Step 1: Let S0 = 03×3. Then, St =
∑t−1
k=0 γ
k(DT )kQDk, t ≥ 1. Now consider, for the time being, the
problem of applying the ut = Gxt, t ≥ 0 to the system in (37) for exactly t time steps8, with single stage
cost
g(xk, uk) = x
T
kQxk, 0 ≤ k ≤ t− 1,
g(xt) = x
T
t S0xt,
and Jpit (x0) =
∑t−1
k=0 γ
kg(xk, uk) + γ
txtS0xt. Then we see that under our policy, Jpit (x0) = x0St(03×3)x0,
which means that xTSt(03×3)x ≤ xTSt+1(03×3)x, t ≥ 0, x ∈ R3. So xTSt(03×3)x is a nondecreasing
sequence.
Under our control policy,
xt+1 = Dxt = P
−1ΛDPxt, t ≥ 0,
⇒ yt+1 = ΛDyt, t ≥ 0,
⇒ yt = ΛtDy0, t ≥ 1,
where yt = Pxt. So the t stage cost can be rewritten as
Jpit (x0) = x
T
0 St(03×3)x0
=
t−1∑
k=0
γkxT0 (D
T )kQDkx0
=
t−1∑
k=0
γkyT0 (Λ
T
D)
kP−1QPΛkDy0
(∗)
≤ λmax(P−1QP ) ‖ y0 ‖22
t−1∑
k=0
γk|λmax(ΛD)|k.
In (∗), λmax(P−1QP ) and λmax(ΛD) are the largest eigenvalues (in modulus) of P−1QP and ΛD respectively.
Since all the eigenvalues of D are within the unit circle, the above sum converges as t→∞.
So we now have {xtSt(03×3)xt}∞t=0 being a nondecreasing sequence bounded from above, which means that
it converges (which is also what the above inequalities show). Hence, beginning with the all zeros matrix,
the iteration (36) converges to some limit, say S, that satisfies (14). Using different values for the vector x0,
it can be shown that this convergence is in the Frobenius norm.
Step 2: Let S0 be any arbitrary symmetric positive semidefinite matrix. Going back to the t step finite
horizon formulation in Step 1, we see that, modifying the final stage cost to g(xt) = xTt S0xt,
xTSt(S0)x = xγ
t(Dt)TS0D
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+
t−1∑
k=0
γkx(DT )kQDkx︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
.
In the above equation, T1 → 0 and we have already shown that T2 converges. This completes the proof
of convergence of the iterates in (36). Finally, to show uniqueness, assume the contrary, i.e., there exists
another S′ that is a fixed point of Eqn. (36). Then, beginning (36) with S0 = S′, we see that St(S′) → S,
which means S′ = S. Hence, the solution to (14) is unique.
8This means we’re now working with a finite horizon version of the problem, with the horizon being t time steps.
27
8.7 Proof of Thm. 3.6
We first define the norm ‖‖ as in Eqn. (11), the space V and the metric ρ exactly as in the proof of Thm. 3.1.
We also note that 〈V, ρ〉 is a complete metric space and the set H := {v ∈ V : v is concave nondecreasing}
is closed in V. Next, recall that D =
[
I − 1
bTKb+r
bbTK
]
A and define the operator Tpi : J→ J by
Tpiv(x, r) = x
TQx + γv (Dx, r) . (39)
The fact that v ∈ V ⇒ Tpiv ∈ V follows using the ideas in the proof of Lem. 3.2 and that v ∈ H⇒ Tpiv ∈ H
from the proof of Lem. 3.3.
Next, observe that the all zero cost function v0 defined by v0(x, r) = 0, ∀(x, r) ∈ S is in H. So, we now only
need to show that, beginning with v0, T kv → Jsp,r. This will follow from the proof of Lem. 3.4, if we can
show that ‖ St − S ‖F→ 0, but that is precisely what Prop. 3.5 states. Hence, Jsp,r ∈ H which concludes
the proof of the theorem.
8.8 Proof of Thm. 4.1
We have proved that E∗x is concave nondecreasing in volatility. Basic convex analysis shows that the epigraph
of a convex function is always convex [BN03] which, therefore is true of the the region bounded below this
concave curve. Since at optimality the volatility constraint is active, the boundary of C is achieved by the
policy that attains the optimum in (21) which, by Thm 4.2 in [Alt99], exists. This means that, C, the set
of (E,V) pairs that can be achieved, is a subset of the subset of R2 bounded by this curve. Therefore, to
complete the proof, we need to show that every point in the region below this curve is achievable.
Recall that at optimality, we require that
x0
dKλ
dλ
x0 +
γ
1− γEn
T dKλ
dλ
n = α, (40)
and that xdKλdλ x is decreasing in λ. This means that as volatility α ↓ 0, to satisfy (40) above, λ ↑ ∞,
which means that J∗r ↑ ∞ and E∗r ↓ −∞. This means that the capacity region is convex, but not compact.
Moreover, since E∗r is a nonpositive, nodecreasing function of α, it has a limit point. Now, let Co denote
the interior of C. It is easy to see that for every point z = (v, e) ∈ Co, there exist points z1 = (v1, e∗1) and
z2 = (v2, e
∗
2) such that e∗i , i = 1, 2 is the optimal efficiency for volatility vi and z = µz1 + (1−µ)z2 for some
µ ∈ [0, 1]. We need to show that there exists some admissible policy that achieves (v, e).
Towards this end consider the policy piµ defined as follows. Let pii, i = 1, 2 be the policy that achieves (vi, e∗i ).
At time t = 0, the policy piµ chooses pi1 with probability µ and pi2 with probability 1−µ and continues with this
choice for all time slots thereafter. The associated expectation operator is Epiµx (·) = µEpi1x (·) + (1− µ)Epi2x (·).
Such a policy obviously achieves efficiency µe∗1 + (1 − µ)e∗2 and volatility µv1 + (1 − µ)v2 (which are both
finite), and is therefore also admissible.
8.9 Proof of Prop. 5.1
It is easy to check that the conditions for controllability and observability do not change from the ones in
Sec. 2, and therefore, going through the constrained MDP analysis (see Sec. 4) once more on this new system,
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the optimal cost is given by
L(ren),∗r (x) = sup
λ≥0
(
zTK
(r)
λ z +
γ
1− γE(n
(r))TK
(r)
λ n
(r)
−λα) , ∀x0 ∈ R3. (41)
As renewable supplies proliferate (a) the aggregate supply from these sources obviously increases and (b)
supplied power becomes more volatile. The factor in Eqn. (REN) that captures both of these effects is the
renewable supply variance ψr. As the contribution of renewables increases, so does ψr. Returning to Eqn. (41),
notice that the contribution of the state disturbance terms to the optimal cost is E(n(r))TK(r)λ n(r) (ignoring
the constant factor), which can be rewritten as ETr
(
K
(r)
λ (n
(r))Tn(r)
)
= Tr
(
K
(r)
λ Ψ
(r)
n
)
, where Tr(M) is
the trace of the matrix M. Since Ψ(r)n is diagonal, it is clear that as ψr increases, so does Tr
(
K
(r)
λ Ψ
(r)
n
)
,
which increases the optimal cost.
We already know from our analysis in Sec. 4 that L(ren),∗r (x) is nondecreasing in α and hence, when ψr
increases, the only way to maintain cost, i.e., social utility, the same is to increase α. But by definition, an
increase in α automatically implies increased volatility in prices.
8.10 Details of Experiments
The market, as mentioned before, is completely specified by the tuple (A,b, Fn, Q, r, γ). Recall that the
matrix A is of the form
A =
β 0 −φ10 σ φ2
0 0 1
 ,
where β, σ, φ1, φ2 are nonnegative reals. In our experiments, we have chosen β = 0.995, σ = 0.900, φ1 =
0.5, φ2 = 0.25 and the discount factor γ = 0.5. The controllability matrix turns out to be0 −0.5 −0.99750 0.25 0.475
1 1 1
 ,
which has a rank of 3, and hence, the system is controllable. Since we have performed experiments for
multiple values of the control penalty r, these values are specified in the description of each experiment in
Sec. 6. The state disturbance is assumed to be IID Gaussian, with 0 mean and covariance matrix9
Ψn =
2.00 0 00 2.00 0
0 0 0
 ,
so Fn ≡ N(0,Ψn).With regards to the cost function, to ensure observability, Q was designed to be symmetric
positive definite with a minimum eigenvalue of 0.5
Q =
 2.38 −1.73 −0.15−1.73 2.15 0.16
−0.15 0.16 0.52
 .
9Choosing a slightly larger value of variance than 1.00 for the state noise helps illustrate the effects of small r more clearly.
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9 Supplementary Material
In Sections 5.2 and 6 we studied the effect of the presence of large-scale renewable sources (such as wind
farms and solar parks) on the supply side of our deregulated market. But apart from large-scale renewable
generation, the electricity market has recently also witnessed burgeoning power supply local to the demand
side or customer side, such as isolated solar panels and small wind turbines. In this section, we would like to
report some preliminary results of studying the effect such sources could have on the volatility of real-time
electricity prices. These so-called Distributed Energy Resources or DERs [Rob, KDMT16], are generally
located “behind the meter,” have nearly zero marginal operating costs [Jos19] and their output is largely
unaffected by grid state variables such as the instantaneous price of electricity. Consequently, studying the
effect of such sources will require some modification to our original system model in Eqn. (SYS).
To incorporate the aforementioned features of DERs, we propose the following market model. As in Sec. 5.2,
we introduce a new state variable, yt, that represents DER supply and evolves as
yt = σrnPrn(t) + wt, (42)
where σrnPrn(t) represents the contribution of the nominal output of the DERs to the aggregate market
demand, and (wt)
∞
t=0 is a sequence of zero-mean independent, identically distributed random variables that
models random temporal variability (caused by weather conditions, etc.). In contrast to earlier notation, we
denote the variance of wt by ψw. To account for the fact that this portion of the load is being handled at
the consumer end, the market demand evolution needs to be modified to
dt+1 = (βdt − φ1pt − yt)+, (43)
where for any x ∈ R, (x)+ = max(x, 0). Notice that, in the absence of the DER contribution term yt, Eqn. 43
boils down to our original demand equation in (SYS).
Nominal renewable generation (especially through photovoltaic sources) tends to show a step-like behav-
ior over a period of T = 24 hours, peaking around midday. As empirical data from the California ISO
shows [ISO], renewable supply satisfies approximately 10% of the total demand over about 14 hours and
approximately 44% for during the other 10, and we model this by setting
Prn(t) =
{
v1, if t < 0.3T or t > 0.7T
v2, if t ∈ [0.3T, 0.7T ] , (†)
Further, it has been observed that apart from the current demand, the price of electricity is also dependent
on load fluctuations [WMO14]. We therefore modify the price evolution equation in (SYS) to reflect this
observation as follows
pt+1 = pt + ut +D (dt, dt+1) , (44)
where, as in [WMO14], the function D(·, ·) : R2 → R+ is assumed to be jointly convex in its arguments and
monotonically increasing in the absolute value of the difference in demand, i.e., if |x − y| > |x′ − y′| then
D(x, y) > D(x′, y′).
We now illustrate what happens when an RTO or an ISO, oblivious to the presence of demand-side renewable
supply, decides to employ the optimal control policy discussed in Sec. 2 on this market. In Fig. 11, we plot the
increase in price volatility with increasing renewable supply. Recall that the variance of the state disturbance
for the supply process was denoted by ψs, and let ∆ = ψwψw+ψs represent the fraction of renewable supply in
the market. Fig. 11 now shows how market price shows unbounded variability as ∆ increases to 100% of the
market share. We choose
D(dt, dt+1) := ξ(dt − dt+1)2 (45)
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to model price variations due to demand fluctuations. The rest of the parameters of the market are as given
in Sec. 8.10. The figure shows that volatility increases to unacceptable levels even for moderately small values
of ξ. This rather precipitous increase in volatility is why we choose to term this phenomenon a “volatility
cliff,” since, beyond a certain level of ∆, the variability rise is high enough to force the dispatch of additional
controllable power supplies, such as coal or natural gas,to reduce ∆ and hence, volatility.
Price fluctuations in real time electricity markets have been observed and reported in, for example, the New
England ISO [KR00] before renewable proliferation became significant. But the volatility reported therein
(see the section titled “Price Volatility” in [KR00, Pg. 5]), is much smaller than that predicted by our model.
This suggests that renewable supplies on the demand side, especially intermittent photovoltaic and wind
sources, could be harmful to deregulated power markets if adopted without due consideration.
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Figure 11: The rapid increase of market price volatility with increasing demand-side renewable penetration. We used σrn = 1.00,
and in Eqn.(†), we set v1 = 0.1 and v2 = 0.44. The initial condition x0 = [1, 1, 2]T . The other parameters of the market are
specified in Sec. 8.10 in the Appendix.
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